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1Abstract
This paper raises some specific issues concerning the choice of exchange rate
regime in transition countries during the run-up to EU/EMU membership. It
argues that there is no “one-case-fits-all” exchange rate regime that accession
countries should uniformly adopt. It also argues that the Maastricht criterion on
inflation is inconsistent with the catching-up process and that this inconsistency
may encourage a “weighing-in” syndrome that diminishes the efficiency of
economic management in the countries about to join the EMU. It makes
suggestions on how the Maastricht criterion on inflation could be adjusted.
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3I. Introduction
With the creation of EMU, a new chapter has been opened in the debate
about the issue of exchange rate regime choice.  At stake is the selection of an
exchange rate regime that will best serve the interests of the accession countries
from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as they prepare to join the EU and to
meet the Maastricht criteria which will allow them to enter later the EMU. There
is little doubt that from an economic standpoint, the CEEs, small economies as
they are, have a strong interest in joining the euro zone once they have liberalized
the trade and capital flows and have become a member of the EU. Entry into the
euro zone will mean lower risk premium and interest rates, as well as lower
transaction costs (to mention just the most obvious economic advantages), along
with a say in shaping the ECB’s monetary policy, the independence from which
becomes more imaginary  than real once a small country has de facto integrated
into the economy of the euro zone. The question is whether there is an ideal
exchange rate regime for transition countries during the run-up to EMU which
can ensure stability, maintain competitiveness, promote structural reforms and
also help to meet the Maastricht criterion on inflation.
The purpose of this paper is not to discuss the many aspects of the issue of
exchange rate regime choice, a topic which is examined and debated in a vast
body of literature. Rather, it would like to raise, particularly in the light of the
current high degree of globalization of financial flows, some specific issues
facing the accession countries which are closest to EU/EMU membership. In this
4context, the paper raises the issue of the adequacy of the Maastricht criterion on
inflation and makes some suggestions for adjusting that criterion.
The accession countries maintain a wide diversity of exchange rate
regimes: practically all varieties can be found from currency board arrangements
(e.g., Estonia) to floating regimes (e.g., the Czech Republic and Poland since
April)1. Hungary’s system is somewhere between these two ends: a
preannounced crawling peg with a relatively narrow band of ± 2.25 percent. A
common goal of these countries is to move toward meeting the Maastricht
criteria while completing the transition, but there seems to be no direct link
between the exchange rate regime in place and the progress achieved in meeting
that goal. For instance, close to EU inflation level has been achieved in Estonia
with a currency board and in the Czech Republic with a floating regime; and
approximately the same path of disinflation has been secured in Poland with a
wide band crawling peg and in Hungary with a narrow band crawling peg (Chart
1). This is testimony to the fact that other policies matter more than the exchange
rate regime. Yet there is an issue of exchange regime choice because the ultimate
goal is to fix the currencies to the euro and that process should be as orderly and
efficient as possible.
5II. Characteristics of CEEs from the point of view of exchange rate regime
choice
The acceding transition countries share a number of characteristics which
have a bearing on exchange rate policy.
First, their wages and non-tradable prices are lower than those of the EU
countries. Since they have a lower level of technical development and
productivity, they are expected to grow faster than the EU as real convergence
proceeds. This means that their wages and non-tradable prices will grow faster in
accordance with the Balassa-Samuelson (BS) effect. The BS effect arises from
the fact that the growth of productivity differs among sectors while wages tend to
be less differentiated. Typically, productivity growth is faster in the traded goods
                                                                                                       
1 Until April 2000, Poland had a preannounced crawling peg with a band which had been progressively
widened to ± 15 percent.
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6sector than in the non-traded goods sector, such as services. To the extent that the
faster productivity growth in the traded goods sector pushes up the wages in all
sectors, the relative prices of the non-traded goods to those of the traded goods
will rise. Since the growth of productivity is, by definition, faster in a catching-
up economy than in a more mature economy, the BS effect implies that, ceteris
paribus, the CPI of the former will rise faster than that of the latter, as the levels
of productivity, wages, and non-traded goods prices converge between the two
economies. Hence, the real exchange rates of the accession countries, as
measured by the CPI, will appreciate during the catching-up process. However,
this process will necessarily take many years and the real appreciation has to be
broadly in line with the underlying BS effect if the country is to avoid loss of
competitiveness and serious balance of payments problems.
The inflation differentials observed within the EMU and the approaching
enlargement of the EU have focused interest on the BS effect. ECB (1999) notes
that there is clear evidence that the BS effect has been at work within the euro
area, though it does not provide precise estimates. IMF (2000) reports
calculations estimating the BS effect in the range of 1.5 and 2 percent per year
for certain individual member countries of the EU. Pelkmans-Gros-Nunez Ferrer
(2000) make precise estimates for the candidate countries and find that the BS
effect could be around 3.5-4 percent for these countries. Simon and Kovács
(1998 and 2000) estimate the BS effect for Hungary at 1.9 percent per year
during the period 1991-98. For Slovenia, IMF (2000) reports an estimate of 2.5
percent per annum. While these estimates for the candidate countries vary
reflecting the different methodologies of calculations, they all show that the BS
7effect for these countries exceeds the 1.5 percent permissible inflation deviation
under the Maastricht criterion.
Second, as a result of the liberalization of trade and payments, the
economies of the accession countries are highly open and integrated into a global
financial system in which the flow of capital is much less restricted than it was
when, for instance, Spain, Portugal, and Greece joined the EU. At the same time,
because of their status as emerging markets, the accession countries remain
exposed to volatile capital flows, as witnessed during the Russian financial crisis
of 1998 when capital fled these countries, irrespective of the state of their
fundamentals or exchange rate regimes.
Third, the candidate countries still face relative price adjustments beyond
the BS effect, due to the continuous structural reforms and liberalization in such
areas as telecommunication, energy, transportation and healthcare. The
inflationary impact of these changes is less stable and progressive than that of the
BS effect because it is linked to the timing of reforms which, in turn, is often
linked to the privatization of those activities.
Fourth, these countries have small domestic markets and rely heavily on
exports and imports for investment and growth. A loss of competitiveness
translates fairly rapidly into a deterioration of the balance of payments.
When considering the choice of an appropriate exchange rate regime, the
authorities of the accession countries are therefore confronted with three
conflicting objectives: (i) to ensure reasonable exchange rate stability in the face
of capital volatility; (ii) to secure an orderly real exchange rate appreciation more
8or less along the path dictated by the BS effect; and (iii) to move toward meeting
the Maastricht criterion on inflation.
The stability objective would be best served by a fixed rate regime.
However, because of the faster inflation inherent in the catching-up process and
the risk that the required wage flexibility and strong supportive policies to sustain
a fixed rate can not be implemented, a rigidly fixed rate carries the danger of
leading to a rapid appreciation of the real exchange rate which could prove
intolerable for most countries. In Estonia, for example, where a currency board
arrangement is in effect, the real exchange rate appreciated by more than 100
percent between 1993 and 1999 (Chart 2). Estonia has been able to cope with this
appreciation because its wages are very low (relative to the skill of the labor
force) and because the small size of the country means that foreign direct
investment (FDI) was able to cover a large part of its sizable current account
deficit, which averaged about 10 percent of GDP in 1996-98. The other countries
would not be able to tolerate such rapid appreciation and such high current
account deficit. The real appreciation in Estonia is perhaps an extreme case and
there are examples of fixed rate regimes where the real appreciation was more
modest and gradual. The point is that a fixed rate needs the backing of strong
monetary and fiscal policies and flexible wages which may not exist in all cases.
Furthermore, a fixed rate would deprive the country of one of its instruments, the
nominal appreciation of the currency, that could help the country to bring
inflation down to the Maastricht level without resorting to excessively tight
monetary and fiscal policy.
9A flexible exchange rate arrangement, in the form of a wide band or free
floating regime could, in principle, provide the possibility for a gradual
appreciation of the real exchange rate in conformity with the BS effect and could
also help the country to meet the inflation target without relying on unduly
restrictive monetary and fiscal policy. However, because transition countries are
particularly exposed to the volatility of speculative capital flows, such regimes
may lead, as seen during 1997-98, to large real exchange rate variability.
Although opinions differ on how bad real exchange rate variability actually is,
there are convincing empirical studies in the literature which demonstrate their
negative economic effects2. While the multinational firms operating in these
countries might more easily cope with real exchange rate fluctuations, the
smaller domestically owned firms, whose development is essential for broad-
based economic prosperity, are much more sensitive to changes in
competitiveness. A wide band or free floating regime also carries the danger that
                                     
2 See for example Baldwin and Krugman (1989), Campa (1993) and Gourinchas (1999).
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if the country’s fundamentals are seen by the markets as appropriate, the inflow
of capital will lead to an excessive appreciation of the currency. Good
fundamentals are not a precondition though, as evidenced by the large inflows
into Russia prior to the summer of 1998.
One argument often made in favor of floating or wide bands is that it
provides better protection against speculative attacks. However, the experience
during the Russian crisis of Poland and Israel, two countries considered as
emerging markets, showed that when there is a sudden shift in market sentiment,
wide bands do not shield against speculative attacks3. Ano her argument is that
because of the greater potential risk of depreciation, wide bands discourage
speculative capital inflows. The experience of the above two countries prior to
the Russian crisis does not support that argument, as both countries witnessed
large capital inflows.
Narrower bands reduce exchange rate variability and can also prevent an
excessive appreciation/depreciation at times of capital inflows/outflows. Whether
this is a sensible policy depends on the magnitude of the capital flows. Hungary
has so far managed to prevent an undue appreciation of its currency without
excessive sterilization costs and successfully defended the forint without
excessive loss of reserves in the wake of the Russian crisis. This experience, and
that of Greece when the authorities defended the drachma during the Asian crisis,
turned out to be beneficial, since output growth strengthened and inflation
continued to decline in both countries after the defense of their currencies. The
point to make here is that there are circumstances, i.e. when the fundamentals are
                                     
3 See Darvas and Szapáry (2000).
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right, under which it makes sense to defend the currency in order to maintain
stability. A narrow band, if it is supported by credible policies, may also lead to
lower premium on domestic interest rates, since the risk of depreciation and
exchange rate variability are lower4. That said, a narrow band is not necessarily
the right regime for all cases; the break-up of ERM1 illustrates that point. A
narrow band, just as a fixed rate, needs to be backed by adequate supportive
policies.
III. The convergence play
The developments of the recent past place the issue of exchange regime
choice in a somewhat new light in the case of the accession countries. The most
important event is the creation of the EMU and the reasonable expectation that
the applicant countries will follow policies that will allow them to become a
member of EMU in the not too distant future. This seems to have provided
enough of certainty for the markets to engage in speculation for a convergence of
interest rates and an appreciation of the exchange rates, if the fundamentals of the
country are judged to be broadly appropriate. Another important development is
the liberalization of markets. Capital has never been as free as it is now to move
across borders and the progress in technology has made the flow of capital much
easier and faster. There is a vast amount of potentially fickle capital ready to take
                                     
4 Until the Russian crisis, the interest rate premium was lower in Hungary which maintains a narrow band
preannounced crawling peg regime than in the Czech Republic with a free floating regime and in Poland
with a wide band regime. The Russian crisis triggered a change in market sentiment and the interest rate
premium in Hungary increased to the level of that prevailing in the Czech Republic and Poland (see
Darvas and Szapáry, op. cit.).
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a higher risk in emerging markets in order to take advantage of higher expected
returns. Fund managers throughout the world invest only a small portion of their
portfolio in emerging markets to maximize returns. Investment banks offer
dedicated emerging market funds to investors, while advising them to invest only
a small portion of their total portfolio into such funds. While all this sounds very
conservative from the point of view of the investor, it adds up to billions of
volatile dollars available to move around among emerging markets. Capital flows
that are insignificant for markets of the size of the United States or the euro zone
can be very disruptive for the exchange markets of small countries like the Czech
Republic, Hungary or even Poland.
Accession countries have some characteristics that promise good returns
with less risks for speculative capital. In order to meet the inflation criterion for
joining the EMU, the monetary authorities are likely to maintain a nominal
interest rate level that is higher than the uncovered interest rate parity,
encouraging investment in fixed income investments, such as government
securities. The favorable growth prospects attract investment into the stock
markets of these countries by investors both with a short run and a medium to
long run perspective. The experience of Greece, Portugal and Spain, where stock
markets outperformed the other European markets in the years following their
entry into the EU, serves as a good example. The expected return on both of
these types of portfolio investments is enhanced by the anticipated appreciation
of the exchange rate.
13
IV. No “one-case-fits-all” exchange rate regime
This situation creates specific problems for the accession countries. First,
it is too early for them to be caught up in the convergence play. The date of EMU
membership is still uncertain and an undue appreciation of their currencies or a
too rapid fall in domestic interest rates will not be consistent with their
stabilization goals. Second, these countries remain vulnerable to shifts in market
sentiment triggered by financial crises elsewhere.  The more speculative capital
enters the country, the more capital will be able to leave it when market
perceptions change, undermining stability. In such circumstances, controls on
short-term capital flows might be of some help. Although such controls can be
circumvented once trade and long-term capital movements have been liberalized,
they can mute the magnitude of short-term capital movements by throwing sand
into the wheels. Nevertheless, since the ultimate goal is full liberalization, short-
term capital controls can only provide a temporary relief. At best one can argue
in favor of not making a full liberalization of short-term capital flows a
precondition for EU accession, only a precondition for joining ERM2.
The experiences with different exchange rate regimes in the transition
countries and elsewhere convincingly  show that there is no “one-case-fits-all”
exchange rate regime that accession countries should uniformly adopt in the run-
up to EU/EMU membership. There are many factors that need to be taken into
account when selecting an exchange rate regime. The most obvious is the
strength of the political commitment to pursue macroeconomic policies – in
particular, fiscal, monetary and incomes policies – which will ensure internal and
14
external stability. The looser that commitment is, the less likely it is that a rigidly
fixed system can survive the pressures of the market. The progress with structural
reforms, such as privatization, the lifting of price controls, healthcare reforms,
etc., also need to be taken into consideration, since they influence the future path
of inflation. Slower progress in these areas would argue in favor of adopting a
more flexible exchange rate regime to accommodate the potential inflationary
shocks.
Prior to EU membership, candidate countries are free to adopt the
exchange rate regime of their choice and they can enter the EU with their
prevailing exchange rate regime. At some point after their accession to the EU,
they are expected to enter ERM2. The logic of ERM2 excludes the adoption of
crawling pegs, free floating without a central rate, and pegs against a currency
other than the euro. It seems that the EU and the ECB will accept euro-based
currency board arrangements (CBA) if they are deemed sustainable, although the
question of the exchange rate being a “matter of common interest” is raised if it
turns out that the exchange rate under the CBA is not sustainable. The EU is
likely to turn around this problem by declaring that CBA may be compatible with
ERM2 as a “unilateral commitment”, meaning that the Eurosystem is not
committed to take part in any possible defense of the peg. Since a rigidly fixed
rate in the form of a CBA, or in any another form for that matter (e.g. the hard
currency policy of Austria)5, can be a powerful catalyst for the adoption of the
right policies, the acceptance of the CBA as a form of participation in ERM2 is
appropriate. The EU is likely to take the view that euroization is not compatible
                                     
5 See Hochreiter and Winckler (1995).
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with ERM2 on the grounds that it should be the final act of the convergence
process and that the new members should receive treatment equal to that of the
initial members with respect to the fulfillment of the convergence criteria. In my
view, the most serious problem with euroization or a CBA is that it takes away
the possibility of an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate as an instrument
of disinflation, placing all the burden of meeting the Maastricht criterion on
inflation on monetary and fiscal policy. This brings me to point out an
inconsistency built into the Maastrich criteria.
V. Encourage “weighing-in” syndrome or change the Maastricht criterion on
inflation?
One of the Maastricht criteria is that one year prior to joining the EMU,
the accession country’s rate of inflation should not exceed by more than 1.5
percentage point the average rate of inflation in those three EMU countries where
inflation is the lowest. Since, as pointed out earlier, the catching-up process
implies a higher rate of inflation, it is not logical to demand the same level of
inflation from countries at very different stages of development. The same level
of inflation can only be achieved either by a very restrictive monetary and fiscal
policy which may result in an excessive sacrifice to growth and employment or
by an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. The appreciation of the nominal
exchange rate is likely to be resisted because of a fear of loss of competitiveness
as capital inflows intensify with the approach of EMU membership. Since there
is a lag between an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate and the
16
concomitant slowing down of CPI, the combination of higher inflation and a
nominal appreciation may lead to excessive loss of competitiveness. This will
encourage the candidate countries to adopt an attitude which one might call the
“weighing-in” syndrome: like the boxer who refrains from eating for hours prior
to the weigh-in only to consume a big meal once the weigh-in is over, the
candidate country will maintain very tight monetary policy and resort to all sorts
of techniques (freezing of administered prices, lowering of consumption taxes,
etc.) to squeeze down inflation prior to accession only to shift back gears after it
has joined the EMU. The convergence of short-term interest rates to EMU levels
that will come with accession will automatically mean a loosening of monetary
policy after the country has become a member of the monetary union. That
loosening will be reinforced if the country had previously allowed its exchange
rate to appreciate against the euro. The result of this stop-go cycle is that the
efficiency of economic management will suffer.
It would be better to recognize the principle of the BS effect explicitly in
the Maastricht criteria by giving more room for maneuver than the one provided
by the present rule which falls short of most estimates of the BS effect. From a
strictly economic point of view, the logical solution would be to link the
permissible inflation deviation to the size of the productivity growth differential,
since it is that differential which determines the BS effect. However, because the
growth of productivity is subject to cyclical factors which can differ from one
country to the other, it would be difficult to find a standard measurement of the
BS effect which can be uniformly applied for defining the permissible inflation
deviation. A better solution would be to group both the member countries and the
17
accession countries on a per capita income basis and define the reference value
for inflation deviation on that basis. The reference for high income countries
would be average inflation rate in the highest per capita income group, and the
reference for the low income countries would be the average inflation rate in the
lowest per capita income group. The logic of grouping the countries on a per
capita income basis is that it is a good proxy of the level of development and
therefore of the extent of the expected faster productivity growth (i.e., of the real
convergence) and hence of the BS effect. Indeed, it is not surprising that the
EMU member countries with the lowest per capita incomes, Portugal and Spain,
have recorded higher than average inflation rates within the euro zone (Chart 3).
Such a differentiated treatment would of course violate the principle of equal
treatment between the initial EMU members and those who join the monetary
union later. It is understandable that the principle of equal treatment was upheld
when the initial criteria for joining the EMU were negotiated and the founding
members established the monetary union. It is difficult to imagine how it could
have been otherwise, since finding an agreement on the different rates of
inflation to be assigned to the different countries could have paralyzed the
negotiations for ever. However, now that the monetary union is established and
functioning, a more fine tuned approach that takes into account the laws of
economic development would better serve the efficiency of economic
management.
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Though logical from a purely economic point of view, there also lies a
danger for the accession countries in the differentiation of the permissible EMU
entry-level inflation rate on the basis of the level of economic development of the
candidate countries. This danger stems from the popular fear in the EMU that
such “permissiveness” could dilute the price stability within the euro zone and
hence to weaken the euro. Such fear could weaken the political support for
enlargement and delay the accession of the CEEs, particularly those whose per
capita income is lowest. A reasonable compromise would be to define the
permissible inflation deviation in reference to the average inflation rate of al  the
EMU ember countries, not just the three with the lowest inflation rate. It is
understandable that when Maastricht was negotiated and there were several
national monetary policies, the founding members wanted to encourage
convergence toward the lowest level of inflation. Now that EMU exists and there
is only a single monetary policy responsible for the inflation in the zone as a
Chart 3: Gross National Income Per Capita and Inflation
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whole, it would make more sense to define the deviation in reference to the
average inflation rate in the whole euro zone. In July 2000, this would have given
an additional margin of 0.4 percent (2.4 percent EMU average vs. 2 percent for
the three lowest inflation countries) for a country wishing to join the EMU.
Although this difference is small, at such low levels of inflation even a difference
of this magnitude is not insignificant. Another option would be simply to
increase the permissible inflation deviation, but this would also be regarded as a
watering down of the Maastircht criterion and therefore could raise the same
popular fear as mentioned above.
VI. Conclusions
As can be seen from the above discussion, the characteristics of the
economies of accession countries, their decision to adopt a track leading to
membership in the euro zone, and the globalization of financial markets have
confronted the authorities of these countries with a complex set of issues to be
taken into account when choosing their exchange rate system. While EU/EMU
accession is still several years away, it is close enough to require decisions as to
what type of exchange rate regime will best serve these countries’ economic
development and the transition to EMU membership. As a result of the combined
impact of globalization and EU convergence, accession countries are likely to
experience continued financial capital inflows which are creating difficult
problems of economic management, even if most of this capital stays in the
country. At the same time, these countries remain exposed to shifts in market
20
sentiment which can cause a sudden reversal of capital flows not otherwise
justified by the development in the fundamentals of the country. There are no
clear-cut solutions for the management of this situation which poses one of the
greatest challenges for the monetary authorities of these countries for the years
ahead, all the way up until EMU membership. This is one reason why those CEE
countries which are the most prepared and the most integrated into the euro zone
should have a strong interest in an early accession to the EU and the EMU.
Meanwhile, the choice of the exchange rate regime in the run-up to EMU should
be essentially determined by the state of the reform process and the political
commitment to continued reforms and sound macroeconomic policies, backed by
sufficient wage flexibility to deal with possible reform-induced or external
shocks. If that commitment is strong and wages are flexible, a more rigid
exchange rate regime can be sustainable. Otherwise a flexible arrangement would
be more appropriate.
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Magyarországon
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1998/1   (január)
Árvai Zsófia - Vincze János: Valuták sebezhetõsége: Pénzügyi válságok
a ‘90-es években
1998/2   (március)
Csajbók Attila: Zéró-kupon hozamgörbe becslés jegybanki szemszögbõl
ZERO- COUPON YIELD CURVE ESTIMATION FROM A CENTRAL BANK PERSPECTIVE
1998/ 3    (március)
Kovács Mihály András - Simon András: A reálárfolyam összetevõi
THE COMPONENTS OF THE REAL EXCHAGE RATE IN HUNGARY
1998/4   (március)
P.Kiss Gábor: Az államháztartás szerepe Magyarországon
THE ROLE OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT IN HUNGARY
1998/5   (április)
Barabás Gyula - Hamecz István - Neményi Judit: A költségvetés finanszírozási rendszerének átalakítása
és az eladósodás megfékezése
Magyarország tapasztalatai a piacgazdaság átmeneti idõszakában
FISCAL CONSOLIDATION, P UBLIC DEBT CONTAINMENT AND DISINFLATION
Hungary’s Experience in Transition
1998/6   (augusztus)
Jakab M. Zoltán-Szapáry György: A csúszó leértékelés tapasztalatai
Magyarországon
1998/7   (október)
Tóth István János - Vincze János: Magyar vállalatok árképzési
gyakorlata
1998/8   (október)
Kovács Mihály András: Mit mutatnak?
Különféle reálárfolyam-mutatók áttekintése és a magyar gazdaság ár- és
költség-versenyképességének értékelése
1998/9   (október)
Darvas Zsolt: Moderált inflációk csökkentése
Összehasonlító vizsgálat a nyolcvanas-kilencvenes évek dezinflációit
kísérõ folyamatokról
1998/10   (november)
Árvai Zsófia: A piaci és kereskedelmi banki kamatok közötti
transzmisszió 1992 és 1998 között
THE I NTEREST RATE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM BETWEEN MARKET AND COMMERCIAL BANK RATES
1998/11   (november)
P. Kiss Gábor: A költségvetés tervezése és a fiskális átláthatóság
aktuális problémái
1998/12   (november)
Jakab M. Zoltán: A valutakosár megválasztásának szempontjai
Magyarországon
1999/1   (January)
ÁGNES CSERMELY-J ÁNOS VINCZE: L EVERAGE AND FOREIGN OWNERSHIP IN HUNGARY
1999/2   (március)
Tóth Áron: Kísérlet a hatékonyság empírikus elemzésére a magyar
bankrendszerben
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1999/3   (március)
Darvas Zsolt-Simon András: A növekedés makrogazdasági feltételei
Gazdaságpolitikai alternatívák
CAPITAL STOCK AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN HUNGARY (May 1999)
1999/4   (április)
Lieli Róbert: Idõsormodelleken alapuló inflációs elõrejelzések
Egyváltozós módszerek
1999/5 (április)
Ferenczi Barnabás: A hazai munkaerõpiaci folyamatok Jegybanki
szemszögbõl
Stilizált tények
LABOUR  MARKET  DEVELOPMENTS  IN  HUNGARY FROM  A  CENTRAL  BANK  PERSPECTIVE  –
Stylized Facts
1999/6   (május)
Jakab M. Zoltán – Kovács Mihály András: A reálárfolyam-ingadozások
fõbb meghatározói Magyarországon
DETERMINANTS OF REAL-EXCHANGE RATE FLUCTUATIONS IN HUNGARY
1999/7 (July)
ATTILA CSAJBÓK: INFORMATION IN T-BILL AUCTION BID DISTRIBUTIONS
1999/8 (július)
Benczúr Péter: A magyar nyugdíjrendszerben rejlõ implicit
államadósság-állomány változásának becslése
CHANGES IN THE I MPLICIT DEBT BURDEN OF THE HUNGARIAN SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
1999/9 (augusztus)
Vígh-Mikle Szabolcs–Zsámboki Balázs: A bankrendszer mérlegének
denominációs összetétele 1991-1998 között
1999/10 (szeptember)
Darvas Zsolt–Szapáry György: A nemzetközi pénzügyi válságok tova
terjedése különbözõ árfolyamrendszerekben
FINANCIAL CONTAGION UNDER DIFFERENT EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES
1999/11 (szeptember )
Oszlay András: Elméletek és tények a külföldi mûködõtõke-
befektetésekrõl
2000/1  (január)
Jakab M. Zoltán – Kovács Mihály András – Oszlay András: Hová tart a
külkereskedelmi integráció?
Becslések három kelet.közép-európai ország egyensúlyi
külkereskedelmére
HOW FAR HAS TRADE I NTEGRATION ADVANCED?
AN ANALYSIS OF ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL TRADE OF THREE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES
2000/2 (February)
SÁNDOR VALKOVSZKY – JÁNOS VINCZE: ESTIMATES OF AND PROBLEMS WITH CORE INFLATION IN
HUNGARY
2000/3 (március)
Valkovszky Sándor: A magyar lakáspiac helyzete
2000/4 (május)
Jakab M. Zoltán – Kovács Mihály András – Lõrincz Szabolcs: Az export elõrejelzése ökonometriai
módszerekkel
FORECASTING HUNGARIAN EXPORT VOLUME
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2000/5 (augusztus )
Ferenczi Barnabás – Valkovszky Sándor – Vincze János: Mire jó a fogyasztói-ár statisztika?
2000/6 (August)
ZSÓFIA ÁRVAI – J ÁNOS VINCZE: F INANCIAL CRIESES IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES : M ODELS AND
FACTS
2000/7 (Oktober)
GYÖRGY SZAPÁRY: M AASTRICHT AND THE CHIOCE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME IN TRANSITION
COUNTRIES DURING THE RUN-UP TO EMU
